



MIND AND MATTER.

A SERMON

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Rom, xi, 36. "Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things; to whom be glory for ever."

St. Paul, as his manner often is, passes here, by an abrupt transition, from elaborate argument to an expression of ardent and almost passionate religious emotion. He had been discussing at great length the moral problems involved in the history of his race—in the seemingly arbitrary election of the Jew to special religious privileges and his equally arbitrary rejection. But from all these and similar questions he rises as if by a leap to that loftier attitude of thought and feeling in which the apparent contradictions and anomalies of the finite world, the enigmas which human life and history present, vanish away in the light of the idea of God. And the idea of God in which he finds consolation is obviously that not of a mere Omnipotent Personality, an external Creator and Ruler, seated in some distant celestial sphere, calling the world into existence by an arbitrary fiat, controlling its affairs after the manner of a human potentate by a series of equally arbitrary interferences. It is rather that of a Being who is not only

the source but the ever-present life of the world, an Infinite Mind or Spirit of whom all things material and spiritual, all the manifold order and beauty of nature, all the thought and life of man, all the events of history, are the immediate, ever-varied, inexhaustible expression; and, lastly, to whom all finite beings and events point as their final end or goal, the unity in which all differences shall be solved, the eternal harmony in which all discords shall be lost;—"of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things."

I take occasion from these words to remark that the argument for God and for that relation of the human spirit to Him which is expressed by the word "religion," has often been weakened or obscured by the false issue on which it has been made to turn. Attempted refutations of Materialism, for instance, have proved ineffective because the theist has tacitly accepted as his own the untenable dualistic theory ascribed to him by his opponents. When the latter attempt in various ways to explain the world, nature and man, in terms of matter and material sequences and laws, and so to preclude the necessity and even the possibility of that higher explanation which is involved in the idea of God,—when, in other words, the attempt is made to reduce the whole system of things, life and intelligence included, to the expression of molecular changes and mechanical force, and so, to eliminate God from the

world, the necessity for the higher explanation is pitched too low when it is represented as the necessity for an Almighty Creator calling all things into existence out of nothing by an act of arbitrary power. a conception it may justly be objected that a result which is not necessarily involved in the nature of its cause proves nothing as to that cause, not even so much as its existence. Having convinced ourselves from independent reasons of the existence of an Infinite Intelligence, we may be content to ascribe the existence of the world to such a Being, though its creation be to us a notion altogether incomprehensible. But when we attempt to demonstrate the existence of God from the existence of the world, an appeal to an inexplicable creative act vitiates the argument. The idea of an arbitrary Omnipotence solves all difficulties, but solves them only too easily. It will not suffice to say, 'Matter or a material world could not make itself, therefore it must have had an omnipotent creator,' for this is simply to say that, somehow or another the world must have been created. It is not to find the proof or reason for God in the world, but merely when reason fails us to take refuge in mystery or wonder, or what is the same thing, in a deus ex machina of arbitrary power. So again, if thus the theist gives an undue advantage to his opponents by identifying God with a mere external omnipotence calling the world into being, it is only an exaggeration of the same error when his theory requires a series of arbitrary creative acts, or the periodic recurrence of acts of external supernatural power. If our conception of the world is such as to require a mysterious creative act for the existence of matter, a fresh creative act in order to account for organic and vital phenomena, and for each new species or group of organisms, and again for the existence of intelligent, conscious beings; and if, finally to account for the innumerable relations between these various orders of existence, inorganic, organic, intelligent and self-conscious, and especially those in which we discover the connection of means and ends. we have recourse to a perpetual series of new supernatural acts shaping and adapting things to each other after the analogy of a human mechanist,—if this be our conception of the world and of the way in which it calls for a God to explain it, there would be some ground for the assertion that it is an essentially dualistic conception, and that it breaks down as an attempt to give unity, order, coherence to our idea of the universe. For unity there cannot be where we have merely a succession of isolated elements with the gaps or interstices filled up by an arbitrary factor, or the perpetual recurrence of inextricable knots, with a deus ex machina brought in to cut them.

When we turn to modern materialistic theories, it must be admitted that, in simplicity and logical consistency, they have greatly the advantage over

any such crude supernaturalism. Stated generally, materialism is a theory which seeks to give unity and completeness to our conception of the universe by regarding all its phenomena as ultimately resolvable into the dynamical action of atoms or particles of matter. When we have determined the nature of these atoms and the laws of their motions, we shall, it is supposed, have before us the secret of the whole knowable world. Physical science has now ascertained that the phenomena with which it deals are only different modifications of a common energy. Heat, light, electricity, magnetism, etc., are but different modes of motion produced under different conditions, and they are all either directly or indirectly convertible into each other. Further, it is the obvious tendency of modern investigation to resolve chemical into mechanical problems, that is, into questions of molecular physics. When we advance from the inorganic to the organic world, we find indeed that science has not yet been able to trace the production of vital phenomena to the operation of physical or chemical But when it is considered that phenomena so agents. different as those of light, heat, electricity, magnetism, chemical affinity, have been proved to be only different forms of energy, each of which is the exact quantitative equivalent of that from which it has been transformed, and further, that the so-called vital energies of plants and animals are dependent on the chemical

interactions of the food they consume and the air they breathe, and that therefore there is no energy in organized substance which has not formerly existed in the form of physical or chemical energy; and finally, when we perceive that, according to modern biological speculation, protoplasm, the ultimate basis of life, is simply a combination of chemical elements acting and re-acting on each other, and is found to be, as to form, function, and substantial composition, identical in all organisms from the lowest to the highest—the result, it is maintained, to which we are led by the strongest presumptive proof, is that life is simply transformed physical energy, and that the energies of the animal frame, muscular, nervous, and the rest, are ultimately resolvable into molecular force. Lastly, though it is admitted by the most eminent of modern physicists that there is an unbridged gulf between organization and thought or intelligence, yet when we reflect on the close and inseparable relation between the various mental activities of conscious beings and the physical organization with which they are connected; when we consider that of the thoughts, emotions, volitions, which in endless multiplicity and variety constitute our conscious life, there is not one which is not correlated to some physical change or motion in the brainmatter of the thinker, and that, so far as we know, the growth, development, decline, the healthy or morbid action of the human mind is invariably connected with corresponding changes of nervous or brain tissue, the conclusion, it is held, to which scientific investigation points is that thought is but a function of matter—the highest expression, it may be, but still the expression, of the same molecular force which has its earliest expression in inorganic nature. "All vital action" are the well-known words of an eminent living biologist, "may be said to be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it. And if so, it must be true, in the same sense and to the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now giving utterance, and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." "As the electric force," again he writes, "the light-waves and the nerve-vibrations caused by the impact of the light-waves on the retina are all expressions of the molecular changes which are taking place in the elements of the electric battery, so consciousness is, in the same sense, an expression of the molecular changes which take place in that nervous matter which is the organ of consciousness." "Is there not a temptation," is the language of a kindred scientific authority, "to close to some extent with Lucretius when he affirms that 'nature is seen to do all things of herself without the meddling of the gods,' or with Bruno when he declares that matter is not that mere empty capacity which philosophers have pictured her,

but the universal mother which brings forth all things as the fruit of her own womb. Believing, as I do, in the continuity of nature, I cannot stop abruptly where our microscopes cease to be of use. By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in that matter which we, in our ignorance of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and the potency of all terrestrial life." What then is claimed for this theory is that it gives us a view of the world and of all the various orders of being contained in it, which is simple and self-consistent, which represents all phenomena as the expression of known principles or laws, and furnishes us with an explanation of them into which no arbitrary or inexplicable element intrudes. It does not require or admit of any supernatural interposition either at the beginning or any subsequent stage of the process for which it professes to account. It is a theory, therefore, which not merely rivals, but is absolutely exclusive of, that explanation of the world on which religion is based—of the idea of God and of that conscious relation to Him in which the spirit of man has seemed to itself to find satisfaction and strength.

Does, then, materialism succeed where popular supernaturalism fails? Has it found the key to the riddle of the universe, the principle at whose potent

touch all gaps in the system of nature are filled up, all breaches of continuity vanish, and over all objects and events, all thinking things, all objects of all thought, the beautiful presence of order, causation, systematic coherence and unity is seen to reign?

I answer, for one thing, that unquestionably the aim of materialistic theories is a true one. It may even be conceded that there is a sense in which in the words I have just quoted, we can "discern in matter the promise and the potency of all terrestrial life," from the simplest organism to the loftiest human intelligence. If we are ever to get at the true explanation of the world, it will doubtless be one according to which there will be no unbridged gap or breach of continuity between one order of being and another; but the transition from the inorganic to the organic, from lower to higher forms of life, and, last of all, from the physical to the psychical, from nature to the self-conscious mind that thinks it, will be seen to be that of intelligible sequence and evolution. It will present to us, in other words, the world as a system so rigidly concatenated that the very least and lowest of its elements shall have a determinate relation to the last and highest, and the former shall be the necessary presupposition and foreshadowing of the latter. In every great work of art the ideal in all its completeness governs the whole process, and the beginning implies the end. It may even be said of the highest

works of art that there is not in their production one faintest initial stroke that is not instinct with the perfect whole that is to be. The first note of some great symphony is not, indeed, the cause of the rich and varied harmonies that succeed; but there is in the work, from beginning to end, an organic unity such that the first prelusive note has in it "the promise and the potency" of all that comes after. The first touch of the painter's brush on the canvas, the first stroke of the sculptor's chisel, is determined by the idea, and has in it the anticipated completion of the glorious conception that floats before the creative imagination of the artist. So, if there is a sense in which matter contains in it the explanation of mind, in which molecular force is the preliminary or the presupposition of life and thought, it will, I submit, be found to be this, that matter, though not in any sense the cause of mind, has yet in it organic relation to the world of living intelligence, that the tiniest atom is significant of the vast cosmical system to which it belongs, and the most infinitesimal of nature's movements—the faintest vibration of the spatial ether, the attractive and repulsive movements of the atoms in a molecule of matter, may be regarded as prophetic of the whole finite universe —as, so to speak, a prelusive note of that universal harmony of which thought or intelligence is the consummation.

But whilst this is a point of view which is consistent with, nay, which is the very nerve and essential characteristic of a true theism, it is one which materialistic theories fail to attain. The unity, in other words, of matter and mind, of the world without and the world within, of nature and the thought or intelligence which comprehends it, is a unity which scientific materialism breaks down in the attempt to demonstrate, and which only the idea of an infinite, all-comprehending Intelligence enables us to reach. In what remains of this discourse I shall endeavour very briefly to show that it is so.

What help does scientific materialism give us in the apprehension of that marvellous process by which physical impressions and movements seem to be transformed into such apparently incommensurable equivalents as sensations, feelings, ideas? Within the tiny cavity or chamber of the human skull, as it would seem, there is perpetually at work a mechanism by which dark and silent material motions, vibrations of ether, irritations and molecular changes of nervous tissue are "transfigured instantaneously into shimmering light and ringing sound "-into the radiant, coloured, vocal world of our sensible experience. But for this wondrous chemistry with which brain matter seems to be endowed, nature would be a dead blank to us; from suns and stars rays of light might continually be pouring forth, etheric vibrations for ever

passing through space, playing on the surface of the body, propagated as motions along its wave-conducting nervous filaments; but if nothing more took place these distant orbs would remain cold and dark, they and the process by which they communicate with us would be only "a congeries of moving masses and vibrating molecules"; for it is only when they reach the brain that they undergo the marvellous transmutation by which they become for us luminous spheres floating in the distant realms of space. Nor is this process limited to our sensations and perceptions of the outward world; the creative constructive power of this cerebral matter seems to extend over the whole contents of human thought, over the whole range of human knowledge. As there is reason to believe that there is a physical which corresponds to every mental process, a certain cerebral movement or change which is the condition of every intellectual act, so there is, it would seem, a sense in which it may be said that the magical process of which I have spoken is one by which to mere infinitesimal changes in a white or gray material substance, not only the thoughts and feelings that make up the ordinary texture of life, but all science, all philosophy, all art, all our conceptions of nature and man and human life, all the vast body of our knowledge and speculations concerning things finite and infinite, owe their existence. Nor is this process one of which the manifestations are only on the

positive side. What the normal action of this subtle material organ creates its morbid or weakened action can dissipate and uncreate. An affection of the conducting nerve or brain centre brings with it corresponding loss of sensation. Let one purely physical condition cease to operate and the waves of ether wake no spiritual response, the voice of the singing of birds is heard no more, and the daughters of music lose for ever their charm: let another cerebral change occur, and the sun and the moon and the stars are darkened, and wisdom at one other entrance is shut out from the soul. Let partial exhaustion or slow decay or sudden injury affect the organ of thought and the capacity of sustained intellectual effort is instantly marred, the insight of the clear intelligence becomes blurred, the soaring imagination falls broken-winged, ideas, feelings, fancies visit no longer the creative mind, and genius is reduced to the level of the dullest of common Let the physical disorganization go further still, and mental activity is wholly annulled, the lucidity of reason gives place to the wild vagaries of madness or the babblings of imbecility; and, finally, with the cessation of the organic or functional activity of the brain utter night and darkness descend over the horizon of consciousness, and the life of thought is rounded with a dreamless sleep.

What then is the inference which from such facts as these modern materialistic speculation would have us

draw? The answer is given in the words I have already quoted, "Consciousness is a function of nervous matter." Thought is an expression of molecular changes in the same sense as discharges from an electric battery are expressions of molecular changes in it. "The thoughts to which I am now giving utterance, and your thoughts regarding them are the expressions of molecular changes in the matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." In what way, indeed, the physical is transformed into the psychical we know not, but here the now accepted doctrine of the correlation of energy comes to our aid. All phenomena however seemingly different are reducible to forms of motion, and are convertible into each other—light into heat, heat into chemical energy, that again into electricity, and so forth. There is the strongest reason to believe that this generalization extends beyond physical changes to the realm of feeling and thought, and that as vital is but transformed mechanical and chemical energy, we reach only another stage or expression of the process when we find vital energy converted into sensations, volitions, and the other phenomena of consciousness. "Thought," says Mr. Huxley, "is as much a function of matter as motion is."

Are we then constrained to adopt the materialistic conclusion with all the destructive consequences as to our spiritual life, as to freedom, responsibility, immortality, with which it seems to be fraught? Volumes of specious argument and sounding rhetoric have been expended on it, often, I cannot help thinking, without finding a single cleft in the logical armour of the materialist. But there are it seems to me two objections, one on the physical, the other on the psychological side of the question, which are absolutely fatal to the materialist theory of the relation of matter and mind.

In the first place, that theory is in irreconcilable opposition to that very law of the conservation of energy on which it professes to rest. What the law means is, as we have seen, that the amount of physical energy in the universe is never diminished or increased; that heat, light, electricity, magnetism, are only various forms of that energy which are convertible into each other, and that each is the exact quantitative equivalent of that from which it has been converted: so that amongst the endless transformations which manifest themselves in the phenomena of the material world, no faintest quantity of energy is ever abstracted or dissipated, no faintest addition to the grand sum of energy is ever made. But now if the materialistic theory be true, instead of the amount of physical energy remaining constant, there lies beyond the region known to science, and within which the calculable changes of energy take place, another and supraphysical region into which drafts of energy are perpetually being made, and from which increments of energy are perpetually being poured forth. energy which is used up in producing mental results cannot be producing physical results at one and the same time; therefore, from the constant realm of nature, where, as we have all hitherto believed, the same physical causes will be followed by the same physical effects without the slightest possible variation, an incalculable abstraction and an equally incalculable augmentation or restoration of energy is ever being made. The law in question is not that the amount of energy in the world, thought included, remains constant, but it is that the amount of energy which expresses itself in purely physical phenomena remains constant, and it absolutely forbids the transformation of physical energy into anything that is not physical energy. But consider what, according to this theory takes place in every case of sensation, in every case of voluntary action. In the former, a physical movement, a light-wave or sound-wave is propagated along its proper nerve till it reaches the brain, and then in the form of a sensation it vanishes into a region beyond, absorbs in a new transformed form from the realm of nature a certain quantity of its energy, leaves certain of its physical antecedents without physical consequents, diminishes for the time the sum of energy in the world. In every voluntary action, on the other hand, an equally arbitrary in-

crease, or at the least arbitrary restoration, of the sum of energy takes place. From the region of mind or consciousness, energy which had passed away from the physical world comes back to it in the re-transformed shape of nerve force, calling forth motion through the muscular apparatus. A physical effect for which there is no immediate physical antecedent is interposed into the order of nature, and the sum of her energy, actual or potential, is more than it was. The alleged transformation of physical into psychical energy is therefore in obvious inconsistency with the law on which it professes to rest, and might be shown logically to involve absurd and impossible results. thought is transformed physical energy, the amount of physical energy in the world will vary with the number of thinkers and the activity of their minds. As education and culture advance, the drain on the reservoir of energy would constantly increase, and a period might come when the whole fund would be exhausted, and the material system might ultimately collapse through the intellectual development of its inhabitants. Nor would the catastrophe be arrested or counteracted by the restoration or recreation of energy through voluntary action; for every volition, if on the one hand it creates nerve force, is itself an act which makes a corresponding demand on nerve force. It takes at the same time that it gives, and thus the process of exhaustion is not counterbalanced by

any process of replenishment. I need not, however, press this thought any further. It is obvious that in point of fact science knows no such breaks of physical continuity. The uniformity of nature, the invariableness of physical law, the principle that like physical consequents may with absolute certainty be looked for from like antecedents, is the first principle of scientific investigation, and so, the very law on which the materialistic theory is based is the rock of offence on which it falls to pieces.

But the final and fundamental objection to all materialistic theories is that they beg the whole question at issue. The matter out of which mind is to be extracted is itself the creation of mind, the thought or intelligence that is alleged to be a function of matter is and must be already presupposed in that out of which it is said to be educed. Consider what the problem is. Before you could reach thought or mind as a last result you must needs wholly eliminate it from the data with which you start. The matter out of which mind is to spring must be matter minus mind, and into the constitution of which not one faintest ingredient of mind must be conceived to enter. The ingredients of the process, so to speak, out of which consciousness is to arise must be wholly outside consciousness, belonging to a world external to thought, and which must be conceived of as existing and operating prior to and apart from the intelligence that thinks them. But one does not need to be a votary of idealism to see that the task which materialism thus involves is an impossible one. Whether there be such a thing as a world of things in themselves that lies outside of and beyond thought, whether in that world there may be any unknown things that might be called atoms, molecules, ethereal waves, nervous fibre, etc., existing in themselves before any mind begins to perceive or think them that is not the question. If such things there are, it is not such matter and motion by which you profess to explain mind, but the matter and motion we know, the matter and motion we think. At any rate you, before you can make anything of them, must perceive and think them. For you matter and force and the rest are matter and force thought about, within consciousness, existing for you as mental conceptions, implying and presupposing every one of them the presence and activity of thought. The least and lowest fact for you is not fact minus thought and out of which, somehow, thought may be conceived to emerge; but it is fact as object of thought, fact for an observing mind, having mind or thought as an inseparable factor of it. And so, in the very raw material out of which you profess to work up mind, mind has already been at work.

The argument, then, on which I insist is that mind cannot be the product of a world which it, to say the least, co-operates in producing, and that the materialist can no more start with bare material facts in the production of which thought or intelligence is not a factor than he can outstrip his own shadow or leap off his own shoulders. The ordinary unscientific observer, indeed, seems to himself to be confronted by a world of realities existing in themselves just as he perceives them, and of which he is simply the passive spectator. All he knows of these outward realities, their permanent identity, their forms, figures, distance, relations are there, as objective facts existing in nature just as he conceives them. The hues and colours are spread over mountain and meadow and forest and flower, the woods are ringing with song, and the multitudinous music of brooks and streams, of winds and waves is ever sounding and reverberating as though there were no ear to listen to it and no sentient and conscious soul to respond to it. The more cultured observer has, of course, got beyond such blind realism, knowing as he does that something at least of what ordinary observation ascribes to nature exists only relatively to his own sensibility. But having got over this crude attitude of mind, the educated observer cannot stop here. A large element of what before seemed bare outward material facts he knows to be contributed by the sensitive consciousness of the observer. What the senses give us is not the world of concrete individual objects existing in

space, but only at most the raw material out of which that world is to be created. It is one of the elementary lessons of psychology that the process of perception is one which implies the active, constitutive power of intelligence, without which the bare data of sensations, visual, tactual, muscular, etc., would give us no real information as to the character of external objects, their particular concrete reality, their position in space, their distance from each other, and from the observer, etc. Thus to constitute the reality of the outward world, to gain even that point of departure which is implied in so much as the bare existence of material things, the presence and the comparing, discriminating, unifying activity of thought is pre-supposed. Matter, in short, out of which by some inconceivable process thought is to be produced, is that of whose very existence thought is the constitutive, creative source. Suppose, then, we accept to the fullest extent the physiologist's account of the matter, what proof or scintillation of proof have we that organization is prior to thought? Prior to thought it may, in the sense that neither he nor I would be able to think unless we had a brain and nervous system of a particular structure. But a theory of the physical conditions of thought is not an explanation of the nature and origin of thought itself. In another sense, to say that organization is prior to thought is a contradiction in terms. Not only is it true in general that neither organization nor anything else can have or be conceived to have any existence save as thinkable existence; but life and organization or an organic structure involve in their very essence a whole host of ideas or categories of thought. Before the physiologist reaches mind, that out of which mind is to be evolved is a thing that is suffused with thought, that swims in an atmosphere of thought.

I must here arrest this discussion, and cannot attempt to examine the bearing of the views I have attempted to criticise on the problems of religion and theology. On this subject I will only offer a single remark in conclusion. I have spoken of the priority of thought or intelligence to matter and the material world. But the priority I claim for it is not and cannot be that of your individual intelligence or mine. It is not our poor thought that creates or uncreates the world. A great poet has said that "in our life does nature live." But it is not so. There was a time when our thought was not; and the world and all that is therein, the round ocean and the living air, the blue sky, the fair and wondrous order of nature, would be as real and as fair, though we and myriads such as we, were not here to perceive and know it. In far away solitudes, which no foot has trodden, nature is not less fair and glorious than when it fills the eye

and sense of man with its wonder and beauty. And there, though unseen and unnoticed by human observation, through uncounted ages and millenniums, the sweet light of each returning dawn, the golden rain of noontide, the fading splendours of evening, have shed their exhaustless munificence over land and sea, over field and forest and stream. And in the illimitable depths of space there may be worlds and suns and systems, though human science has never observed their phenomena or grasped the laws that govern them. But though nature lives not in our life, what I have said as to the necessary priority of thought to nature, the impossibility of any existence that is not existence for thought, is not the less true. Nay, just because it is not true of your thought or mine, this principle contains in it the strongest, the deepest, the one irrefragable proof of the existence of a thought, a mind which is before and beyond all finite intelligence, or rather to which the words "before" and "after" are inapplicable, the one eternal thought in which all things live and move and have their being, of which all nature, all beauty, all order, all finite thought and life are the ever accumulating expression. And this, as it is the surest proof of God, is also that which gives us the grandest conception of His nature. Many of the representatives of modern scientific materialism have denied that the tendency of their theory is atheistic. But the only conception of God of which

avowedly their speculations admit, is a God outside of knowledge, the dark impenetrable background of the phenomenal world, our only relation to whom or to which is not intelligent admiration or love, but simply awe and blind reverence for the unknown and unknowable. The object of religion, one of the most eminent of them tells us, is "the mystery from which we have emerged and which each succeeding age is free to fashion in accordance with its own needs." But if this be the only God to whom science points and with the notion of whom it proposes to satisfy the infinite aspirations and inextinguishable hopes of the spirit of man, the boon it offers is a boon for which I, for one, cannot pay it the poor tribute of my gratitude. I cannot bow before this blank inscrutability, of whom you tell me I can neither affirm nor deny anything, and for whom, therefore, I can feel no intelligent reverence. Not such is He, the God to whom the principle I have imperfectly illustrated points—the Being who is not banished beyond the bright domain of intelligence, but who is Himself the light of all our seeing, the Infinite thought which, while it transcends all, yet reveals itself in all we see and think and know, and discloses itself more and more with every step in the onward march of human knowledge. The God of whom we can thus conceive is no blank mystery, no veiled divinity, withdrawn for ever from us into night and darkness, with whom the conscious spirit

of man can hold no communion. It is some reward of a truer speculation if it enables us to put away this phantom of nescience and to think of God as the God of truth, of science—the Being whose dwelling place is not thick darkness, but wherever knowledge sheds its kindly light over the paths of men—whom every true thought, every fresh discovery, every idea of the wise and every intuition of the good, are helping us to know more fully—the Being, in one word, who is Himself the Truth absolute and inexhaustible, after which the greatest of the sons of men have sought with a thirst which is unquenchable, and which, when they have in any measure grasped it, is the inestimable reward of all their endeavours.

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